Temporary employment contracts and employee well-being during and after the financial crisis: Introduction to the special issue by Guest, David E & Isaksson, Kerstin
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/0143831X18804706
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Guest, D. E., & Isaksson, K. (2019). Temporary employment contracts and employee well-being during and after
the financial crisis: Introduction to the special issue. ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 40(2), 165-
172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X18804706
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 15. May. 2019
  
SAS-141 1 - 1 
 
 
Acculturation of the Core Concepts of European Security 
Dr Andrew Corbett, Dr Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović 
Kings College London and University of Warwick 
UK / University of Potsdam 
 Andrew.corbett@kcl.ac.uk   sehovic@uni-potsdam.de  
ABSTRACT  
Deterrence is a psychological process designed to influence the decision making of a potential adversary; 
it works best prior to the decision being made.  Current NATO definitions of deterrence and other key 
terms such as resilience appear very carefully constructed but deliberately ambiguous in order to 
accommodate differing national interpretations of how deterrence works, and what resilience means in that 
context.  In practice, these ambiguities in policy curtail the Alliance ability to conduct a coherent 
deterrence strategy, and significantly inhibit the ability to integrate all deterrence elements once a crisis 
has been recognised.  Public use of these ambiguous definitions enables development of ostensibly 
coherent public policy in both deterrence and resilience, while creating serious tensions in the 
development and implementation of strategies for either.  European NATO Allies and EU members would 
benefit greatly from an acknowledged, if not necessarily common, understanding of the use of key terms 
in their own security lexicon, or at least from a more honest acculturation of the key elements of their 
security strategies. 
 
Based on research conducted with practitioners in NATO and EU, and experience gained within the 
NATO strategic HQ, this paper examines the understanding of deterrence in theory and practice in the 
Alliance, and describes an embryonic research project designed to investigate the nature of terminology in 
decision-making and practice, focusing on contemporary acculturation of key terms such as deterrence and 
resilience in the reactions to the activities of a newly assertive Russia across Europe’s Eastern borders 
from the Mediterranean to the High North.   
 
Differences in understanding of deterrence appear to have become manifest in an Alliance inability to 
adapt strategy to the re-emerging salience of deterrence as a policy issue in the European security 
environment after the Russian annexation of Crimea.  The Alliance should address this shortcoming in 
order to enhance its strategic messaging of resolve and resilience quietly and consistently to deter an 
increasingly assertive Russia.  Early outcomes from this project suggest that this does not require 
escalatory brinkmanship with Russia, simply a more considered and coherent linkage between the various 
terms used in deterrence policy and strategies available to the Alliance leadership.   
 
Introduction 
Language matters.  At its most fundamental, Deterrence is a psychological process designed to influence the 
decision-making of a potential adversary. It therefore relies on communication in all its forms.  The 
terminology used in NATO summit communiques, and in all Alliance publications, is painstakingly 
wrought, often with extensive negotiation in order to reflect nuances acceptable to each Ally.    It is the core 
argument of this paper that due to tacitly accepted nationally acculturated nuances reflected and folded into 
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deliberate ambiguity in key policy terminology, there is a disconnect between Alliance political statements, 
and Alliance, and National strategic plans, the latter of which should be derived from, or at least coherent 
with, the former.  Succinctly stated, this paper illustrates a gap between articulated and accepted Alliance 
policy, and how it is interpreted, translated, or acculturated, both Alliance-wide and at the level of National 
strategy. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it considers the evidence supporting this thesis by comparing shifts in 
the language in the political statements on ‘Deterrence’ at the five NATO Summits since Lisbon in 2010, 
against the evolution of key Alliance doctrine; the “fundamental principles by which the military forces 
guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.”1  The 
very language of the doctrine, “requires judgement in application” hints at the possibility of multiple 
interpretation of “actions” as well as of “objectives.” The choice of the term ‘Deterrence’ reflects the paper’s 
hypothesis of a historic as well as interpretive break between a culture of deterrence as a vestige of the Cold 
War, which gives rise to the gap between Alliance strategic doctrine and Alliance policy, further fragmented 
at the Nations’ level.  
 
Focusing on the break between NATO policy and NATO doctrine, the hypothesis states that there is no clear 
link between evolving policy statements and development of associated doctrine in key areas such as 
deterrence and resilience. This paper suggests that development of strategy and doctrine at NATO 
headquarters suffers from a disconnect between agreed-upon, but ambiguous, policy statements, and precise 
and doctrinal direction necessary to guide action, a significant ‘gap’.  This gap also appears evident between 
Alliance and ensuing national strategic plans, because of the nuances left un-acculturated at the international 
or Alliance–wide policy level.  
 
Following the initial discourse analysis tracing the linguistic shifts on deterrence and resilience at the 
Alliance levels, in order to test this second hypothesis, the second part of the paper describes a proposed 
research programme to chart the course of a hypothesized evolution in the ‘cultures of security’ between the 
Alliance and National states. The programme envisions a series of workshops testing national articulation 
and acculturation of assumptions and nuanced interpretations of key security terms, including deterrence and 
resilience, as well as health security, to capture the breadth and depth of the security discourse.  Health 
security is included because it straddles doctrinal and policy illustrating the roles of articulation and 
acculturation of cultures of security as these pertain to Alliance and national strategy of defence and 
deterrence, particularly in the context of the ongoing migration debates. Nonetheless, the principal argument 
of this paper relies on the concepts of ‘deterrence’ to illustrate the ‘gap’. Additional terms will be proposed 
and distilled from the discussions as the research programme is developed and progresses.  
The Gap Analysis 
The NATO Strategic Concept is the highest level operating doctrine for the Alliance and is regularly cited in 
discussions at all levels within the Alliance.  The current ‘2010 Strategic Concept; Active Engagement, 
Modern Defence’ was published at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010.  The previous 1999 Strategic 
Concept listed ‘Security’, ‘Consultation’ and ‘Deterrence and Defence’ as the three fundamental security 
tasks of the Alliance, with ‘Crisis Management’ and ‘Partnership’ as subordinate tasks to ‘enhance the 
                                                     
1 NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine 28 Feb 2017 Lexicon p-9 
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security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.’2  This language clearly prioritizes territorial and political 
integrity and defence.  
 
Prior to the Lisbon Summit, the 1999 Strategic Concept was enhanced with the 2009 Declaration on Alliance 
Security which had been agreed to at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. It stated; 
 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defence, based on the indivisibility of 
Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, based on 
an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our 
overall strategy.3 
 
This paved the way towards the language of the 2010 Strategic Concept which described the Alliance’s three 
core tasks as; ‘Collective defence … (NATO will deter and defend against any threats of aggression)… 
Crisis management … [and] Cooperative security.’4  It also stated that the “Euro-Atlantic area is at peace 
…”5 and; 
 
Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a 
core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear 
weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. (paragraph 17)  
  
This does not ‘feel’ like a substantial change to the tenor of the 1999 Strategic Concept, and seems to be 
compliant with the intent of the 2009 Declaration on Security, but the exact terms used were, nevertheless, 
the subject of extensive debate due to different interpretations of the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance 
deterrence posture.6  This led to the agreement at Lisbon to work towards a ‘Deterrence and Defence Posture 
Review’ to be rolled out at the Chicago Summit in 2012. It concluded that ‘NATO is committed to 
maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and 
defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept.’7 In addition, the elevation of ‘crisis 
management’ and ‘cooperative security’ suggest a slightly broader focus beyond the territorial space of 
Alliance Members and into and onto potential destabilizers further afield. The allusions here may foretell the 
2018 focus not only on further deterrence but also on resilience.  
 
Strategic Level Language  
Draft political statements, and strategic policy documents such as the Strategic Concept, are drafted in the 
Brussels HQ in political committees, usually by the Defence Policy and Planning Committee.  The Military 
Committee, and the two Strategic Commanders, Allied Command Operations (ACO), and Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) are each represented on these committees.  The initial text is usually produced by the 
International Staff (permanent NATO Civil Service) with input from Allies, and this draft forms the basis of 
discussions between the Allies in committee until consensus is reached.  The agreed draft then forms the 
basis of Summit Communiques or policy documents.   
     
                                                     
2 NATO 1999 Strategic Concept para 10 
3 Declaration on Alliance Security (2009)   
4 NATO 2010 Strategic Concept para 4 
5 NATO 2010 Strategic Concept para 7 
6 KAMP, K. H. 2010. NATO's Nuclear Weapons in Europe: beyond "Yes" or "No". In: LARSEN, J. (ed.) NATO Defence College 
Research Paper. Rome: NATO Defence College. P2 
7 NATO 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review  paragraph 32 
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Alliance military doctrine is produced by the NATO Standardisation Office. The initial drafts are produced 
by members of the NATO International Military Staff (IMS) with extensive coordination with the two 
Strategic Commands.  The IMS also tend to socialise key elements of the drafts with their International Staff 
peers to ensure policy compliance.  Nations are involved to a greater or lesser degree throughout the editing 
process and each document is published only once it has been endorsed by each Nation in the appropriate 
Military Committee Working Group.  
 
It is beyond the remit of this paper to reference classified Alliance documents.  However, given the increased 
political focus on deterrence as one of the core operating concepts for the Alliance deterrence and defence 
posture, it would be reasonable to expect the (unclassified) higher level operating doctrine of the Alliance to 
reflect such a shift in political emphasis.   
 
Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine is the capstone NATO doctrine 
for Allied joint operations. It explains the strategic context for such operations and focuses 
on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint operations.8 
 
Making that strategic context coherent relies upon language. The Lexicon to AJP-01(E) includes nine pages 
of expressions that are all described as ‘NATO Term - NATO Agreed’.  They include conceptual terms such 
as ‘strategic level’, but neither ‘Deterrence’ nor ‘Resilience’ are defined in AJP-01, leaving these open to 
interpretation and nuance.   
 
The 2010 iteration of AJP-01 contained an extended analysis of the Strategic Context and the military 
implications; it considered the role and exploitation of deterrence in cooperation, confrontation and conflict: 
 
Even before conflict arises, demonstrable military capability and measured power 
projection will contribute to deterrence (to dissuade would-be aggressors from acting 
against the interests of any Alliance member). Faced with either an imminent crisis or a 
more gradual deterioration in relations within or between states, NATO forces may be 
required to prevent further deterioration in security towards armed conflict. Deterrence 
may be supplemented or replaced by more assertive coercion and conflict prevention 
activities, such as focused military intervention. During periods of cooperation and 
confrontation, the focus is likely to be on deterrence and coercion; once conflict develops 
however, emphasis shifts to compellence by the application of force.9  
 
This was the most detailed guidance on deterrence that unclassified 2010 Alliance doctrine provided.  In this 
iteration, it is clear that ‘deterrence’ is conceived as a proactive activity, designed to dissuade would be 
aggressors ‘even before conflict arises’ and involves ‘demonstrable military activity and measured power 
projection…’’  The subsequent 2011 AJP 03(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations10 
provides no further guidance, and does not mention the concept of deterrence at all.   
 
 
                                                     
8 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(E), Allied Joint Doctrine 28 Feb 2017 page ix 
9 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine 21 Dec 2010 article 0233 
10 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-03(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 16 Mar 2011  
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Operational Level Language  
The highest level operational doctrine that mentions deterrence identified by this study is the 2016 AJP-3.2 
Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations.  In describing the characteristics of Land Forces, it states; “Land 
forces contribute greatly to the deterrent effect of the joint force. The delivery of deterrent effects is the 
responsibility of the joint force. It will often be the land force, through its ability to maintain a presence in 
the proximity of a target audience that will maintain the effect.”11  The Doctrine does not elaborate further on 
the deterrent effect of Land Operations, nor does it clarify such a force’s objectives.  It does, however, define 
deterrence in its lexicon: ‘deterrence: The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of 
coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible 
military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act (NTMS - NATO Agreed).’12 
Crucial to this debate about deterrence based on a vague definition is the understanding of the nature and 
means of nuclear deterrence.  
Some commentators conclude that there was a lack of consensus at the political level as to the role of nuclear 
weapons in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and that the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review 
(DDPR succeeded only in providing the external appearance of consensus, while ‘papering over the 
cracks.’13 
 
Certainly, the DDPR did not provide in-depth guidance to Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT) on deterrence strategy or further clarification on the role of the force 
elements (conventional, nuclear and missile defence).  It declared that the “Allies’ goal is to bolster 
deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the 
Alliance (para 2).”   It went on “NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, 
conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence...” (para 32).  This closely reflects 
the ‘appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces’ of the 2010 Strategic Concept para 19.  And in 
DDPR para 34: ‘NATO will continue to adjust its strategy, including with respect to the capabilities and 
other measures required for deterrence and defence, in line with trends in the security environment.’ 
 
In 2012, there was tenuous consensus at the policy level on the interpretation of deterrence, threatened by 
fundamental differences between Allies on the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance deterrence posture.  
At the strategy level however, there was clear guidance from AJP-01 (which predated the DDPR) just what 
deterrence entailed.  At the time, the Alliance Strategic Concept envisaged peaceful coexistence in the Euro-
Atlantic region and potential strategic partnership with Russia.  In short, there was little perceived threat for 
which deterrence needed to be sustained. 
 
A simple discourse analysis would suggest that deterrence is becoming more significant in NATO policy 
statements since 2014.  Clearly there are different contexts in which the term ‘deterrence’ is used. They 
include to describe nuclear deterrence, or to contextualise other States’ deterrence activities. In the 2010 
                                                     
11 AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations Ed A v1 Mar 16 art 0135.g 
12 AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations Ed A v1 Mar 16 Lexicon 
13 KAMP, K. H. 2012. NATO’s New Nuclear Consensus. In: CHALMERS, M. (ed.) A Problem Deferred?  NATO’s Non-
Strategic Nuclear Weapons after Chicago. London: Royal United Services Institute, CHALMERS, M. & BERGER, A. Ibid.A 
Problem Deferred?  NATO’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons after Chicago. In: CHALMERS, M. & BERGER, A. (eds.) 4-12 
ed.: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, TERTRAIS, B. Ibid.Beyond Nuclear Weapons?  NATO 
and Strategic Deterrence by 2020. In: CHALMERS, M. (ed.). Royal United Services Institute. 
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summit communique, ‘deterrence’ figured five times, four times in 2012, eight times in 2014, and twenty-
eight times in both 2016 and 2018, although not in precisely the same phrases.    
The 2014 Summit in Wales was overshadowed by the Russian annexation of Crimea and invasion of 
Ukraine and much of the communique was targeted at (re)assurance of Allies:   
The [Readiness Action Plan] assurance measures include continuous air, land, and 
maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, 
both on a rotational basis. They will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for 
assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving 
security situation.  …   We will also establish an appropriate command and control 
presence and some in-place force enablers on the territories of eastern Allies … they will 
also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located at NATO's periphery for deterrence and 
collective defence.14   
The difference in deterrence and defence as it pertains to these deployments, facilities and enablers is not 
explained.  Nuclear deterrence is treated as a discrete element in paragraphs 49-52 using terminology 
essentially unchanged from the 2012 communique and DDPR.  The unclassified high level doctrine was not 
amended to reflect these changes in force posture and deterrence and defence policy, although a number of 
classified Contingency Operations Plans were rapidly developed to implement the Readiness Action Plan.   
By 2016, the status quo in Crimea appeared to have become the new norm, recognised by the OSCE Minsk 
Protocols of Sept 14 and Feb 15.  The focus of the 2016 Warsaw summit shifted from assurance of Allies to 
deterrence of further Russian aggression.  The Warsaw communique mentioned deterrence 28 times, and 
employed more robust language than its predecessor;  
NATO has responded to this changed security environment by enhancing its deterrence 
and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, 
and by suspending all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and 
Russia, while remaining open to political dialogue with Russia.15   
Reflecting tensions within the Alliance, it also stated; “We are adapting our defence and deterrence posture 
to respond to threats and challenges, including from the south.”16  However, in a clearly defined and 
articulated statement (at the policy level), the Alliance stated;  
Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance's mission and purpose … We will 
ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against 
potential adversaries and the full spectrum of threats that could confront the Alliance from 
any direction. … All of the actions that we have taken to strengthen our deterrence and 
defence posture require appropriate investment in capabilities and the development of 
highly-capable and deployable forces.17  
The communique continued;  
                                                     
14 NATO 2014 Newport Summit Communique para 7/8 
15 NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique para 11 
16 NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique para 26 
17 NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique para 32 & 33 
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… we have decided to further strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. 
Building on the success of the Readiness Action Plan, today we are adopting a broad 
approach to deterrence and defence which draws upon all of the tools at NATO's disposal. 
This will provide the Alliance with a range of options to be able to respond to any threats 
from wherever they arise. Given the different nature, types and origins of threats, we will 
tailor our response to specific circumstances … As a means to prevent conflict and war, 
credible deterrence and defence is essential. At the same time, as part of the Alliance's 
overall approach to providing security for NATO populations and territory, deterrence has 
to be complemented by meaningful dialogue and engagement with Russia, to seek 
reciprocal transparency and risk reduction. Those efforts will not come at the expense of 
ensuring NATO's credible deterrence and defence.18 
Nuclear deterrence was again dealt with in a separate part of the communique (para 52-55), in terms 
unchanged from the previous communiques. AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, the highest level doctrine which 
should implement these changes, was updated in February 2017, nearly eight months after the Warsaw 
summit, yet far from considering how deterrence would be exercised in this new strategic security 
environment, the updated version deleted all mention of the term.  Nor were the subordinate doctrine 
publications amended to reflect this increased focus on deterrence capabilities.19   
In 2018 the Alliance declared: “We continue to respond to the deteriorated security environment by 
enhancing our deterrence and defence posture, including by a forward presence in the eastern part of the 
Alliance.”20  The communiqué also included reference to the “…fight against terrorism [is] an integral part 
of the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence and projecting stability; as such, it 
contributes to all three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.”21  This 
inclusion reflects the demands of some allies that the Alliance should not be focused on the return of geo-
political threats.  For some, the fight against terrorism is an element of the deterrence profile.  It is not for 
others.   
While we have placed renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence, we have 
also ensured that NATO retains its ability to project stability and fight against terrorism. 
… As we continue to ensure that the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture remains 
credible, coherent, and resilient, and that the Alliance can continue to safeguard the 
freedom and security of all Allies, it is of strategic importance to increase responsiveness, 
heighten readiness, and improve reinforcement. We will continue to assess the relevant 
military elements of the Alliance’s strengthened deterrence and defence posture to ensure 
its effectiveness.22 
 
                                                     
18 NATO 2016 Warsaw Summit Communique para 38 & 39 
19 AJP-3.3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations Ed B ver 1 Apr 16; article 2 asserts that; ‘… the unique 
attributes of air and space power offer politicians and commanders the means to create a wide range of effects including 
contributing to engagement, deterrence and coercion activity at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.’  It does not say how, 
nor are deterrence or deterrent effects defined.  AJP-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting Edition A Version 1 Apr 16 (no 
mention of deterrence or deterrent); AJP-3.10.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations Ed B v1 Sept 14 (no mention 
of deterrence or deterrent); AJP-3.8 Allied Joint Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, radiological and Nuclear Defence Edition A 
ver 1 Mar 12 – remains extant with no reference to deterrence. 
20 NATO 2018 Brussels Summit Communique para 5 
21 NATO 2018 Brussels Summit Communique para10-12 
22 NATO 2018 Brussels Summit Communique para 12 
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The communique highlights changes in a number of areas as part of the maintenance of the Alliance 
deterrence and defence posture in all domains.  These include; an enhanced readiness initiative, the NATO 
Readiness Initiative (para 14), viable military reinforcement capabilities (para 15), maritime situational 
awareness (para 19), an overarching NATO space policy (para 19), cyber capabilities (para 20), tailored 
forward presence in the Black Sea (para 26), and; defence capacity building and partnerships in the Middle 
East and North Africa (para 50 and 55).  Deterrence appears to be the core capability in the Alliance today. 
 
However, while virtually every Alliance military asset can be claimed to contribute to deterrence, there does 
appear to be a shortfall in the link between the political aspirations of the 2018 communique, and the 
doctrine, the ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of 
objectives.’  There is no new doctrine which aligns these disparate capabilities with that most subtle of 
objectives, deterrence, nor does it appear that there are changes to existing doctrine in print in the short term.   
There are also political tensions evident in the communique; “In cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could 
decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of armed attack. We are enhancing our 
resilience, improving our situational awareness, and strengthening our deterrence and defence posture.”23  
“The Council could decide to invoke Article 5” is hardly language to convey implacable resolve.  Similarly, 
since 1991, Alliance references to nuclear deterrence capabilities have remained completely discrete from all 
other capabilities.  Obviously nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from conventional weapons, and 
there is no question of returning to the nuclear war-fighting scenarios of the Cold war, but in terms of 
deterrence, an inability to articulate an Alliance nuclear deterrence posture in public suggests a lack of 
coherence which undermines the very credibility on which deterrence depends.   
Whilst it is easy to assert that capabilities alone can deter, modern deterrence thinking tends to focus on a 
triumvirate of capability, communication and credibility.  To be credible in the mind of a potential aggressor, 
a deterrent posture must contain capable forces (NATO has no peer in capability, in theory); the capability 
and willingness to resort to force must be communicated to the adversary, and it must be done so in a 
coherent manner such that the overall impression is one of credible and implacable resolve. 
Although the Alliance may boast about its military capabilities at the political level, without Alliance-wide 
doctrine to operate these disparate functions, the overall effect of the military capability is significantly 
reduced, not only in conflict, but in the credibility of the threat that it poses to a potential adversary.  An 
inability to agree strategic doctrine suggests inhibitions on the ability to operate jointly effectively, and also a 
lack of genuine political cohesion to derive the specific instructions to inform that strategy.  In terms of 
deterrence, this is the more important.  Beneath the paper, the cracks are too deep.  The deterrence experts in 
the Alliance know this, yet NATO appears unable to produce coherent strategic doctrine that reflects the 
current political emphasis on deterrence as the core Alliance mission.   
The Research Programme 
The gap analysis above introduced the issue – articulation of ambiguity - in the divergent language in NATO 
Alliance and National policy and doctrine. This section describes the concepts of acculturation and outlines 
the proposed research program.  
Acculturation assumes a clear articulation of language and concepts, which Argument One noted is lacking 
in the translation of Alliance doctrine to policy. While this clarity facilitates nuanced interpretations of both 
                                                     
23 NATO 2018 Brussels Summit Communique para 21 
Acculturation of the Core Concepts of European Security 
SAS-141 1 - 9 
 
 
doctrine and policy, politically vital in an organization of 29 distinct national members, it is a hindrance to 
collective policy action. More to the point here, such lack of clear articulation impedes a commonly 
acculturated culture of security, wherein words and meanings attributed to them, such as deterrence and 
resilience do not but need to be understood in a (more) similar vein. It is the job of acculturation to facilitate 
such common understandings in order to enhance the implementation of Alliance doctrine and policies at the 
Alliance but also – arguably more importantly – at the National levels.  
The role of acculturation is most clearly expressed when compared with intra- and extra-Alliance articulation 
of doctrine. Whereas intra-Alliance understanding with regard to its inclusions or expansion rests on an 
interpretation of doctrine favouring self-determination in ascension, extra-Alliance understandings, notably 
on the part of Russia, read in the text an (aggressive) stance towards incorporation or expansion. While this 
particular schism is related to extra-Alliance articulation, it points to the challenge of necessary acculturation 
of core concepts within the Alliance without which a common idea or posture is impossible.  
Acculturation is not Strategic Culture  
The process of acculturation is not to be conflated with ‘strategic culture.’ Strategic culture rests upon a 
historic and psychological process that delineates the bounds within which security can be thought and 
integrated into policy.24  This is evidenced in the different strategic cultures of, for example, the U.S. and 
Germany. Whereas the strategic culture in the U.S. by and large allows for the conception of preventive and 
thus aggressive security interventions, that of Germany (explicitly) prohibits both.  
Acculturation would mean that these two irreconcilable points, within for instance Alliance doctrine, become 
reconciled. Of course, each of these shifts would also imply a change in the strategic culture of the U.S. and 
Germany, with implications for Alliance doctrines and policies regarding deterrence and resilience. In that 
sense, acculturation and strategic culture are intertwined – but not identical.  
A first steps towards any such change in strategic culture is therefore a) the clear articulation of core ideas; 
and b) their acculturation at the Alliance and National levels. It is worth nothing that there is substantial 
confusion over the term deterrence, pertaining to the psychological and practical (non-) use of especially 
nuclear weapons. As the strategic culture around discourses of possible use of such weapons undergoes a 
radical reconfiguration, it becomes imperative that the Alliance articulate and acculturate its position among 
its Member States. Furthermore, the NATO definition of resilience is not only different, but mutually 
exclusive to the EU definition, despite 22 states being members of both organizations. Given that the most 
likely area and arena of activity for both NATO and the EU remains continental Europe, clarifying and 
finding consensus on these ideas and their applicability is of paramount importance. Finally, currently, the 
concept of resilience as an element of deterrence, and its relations to additional areas pertinent to defence and 
security such as health is simply not considered. 
NATO Allies and EU Members States, as well as the U.S. and the U.K., among others, would benefit greatly 
first from an articulated and commonly acknowledged definition of key terms. Second, even if they do not 
reach a common understanding of the terms of use of these key terms, they should arrive at a position 
wherein at the policy and programmatic level they are aware of and can act according to their knowledge of 
                                                     
24 Risse, Thomas (2007). Deutsche Identität und Außenpolitik. In Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, eds. Siegmar Schmidt, 
Gunther Hellmann, and Reinhard Wolf. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden; and 
Techau in Schnaubelt, Christopher M. 2011 “Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Strategic and Operational Challenges”, 
NATO Defense College. Rome.  
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their differences. In addition to the intra-Alliance benefits, such an exercise is of increasing pertinence as the 
Alliance shifts some of its focus to (external) crisis management and cooperation. 
 
Articulation and acculturation aim to identify what is and how it is to be secured, primarily through 
deterrence and resilience. It should lead to a (common) culture of security. By contrast, strategic culture 
presumes the parameters within which security is pre-defined and pre-emptively to be guarded. This 
distinction hints at the core of the issue explored here, namely, whether the nuanced uses of terms, such as 
deterrence and resilience, reflect a similar, or not culture of security across NATO Alliance national debates. 
If the terms refer to similar ideas, then the Alliance has a common culture of security which can then feed 
into its strategic culture. If not, as this paper hypotheses, then there is a cacophony of ideas which need to be 
harmonised in order to create a strategic culture of common security.  
In order to tease out the nuances pertinent to the articulation and acculturation of key Alliance doctrine and 
policy related to deterrence and resilience, this paper proposes the following applied research program:  
At this stage, the research design is experimental and the evolution of the second stage is contingent on the 
outcome of the first stage. The research will be focused on two series of workshops. The first series will 
involve four workshops, with each workshop focused on one of the key ambiguous terms. These will 
consider; deterrence, resilience, cyber security and health security. These issues have been selected as the 
lead elements because they were identified as salient during the two exploratory workshops held in April and 
September 2018. 
 
Each workshop will comprise two hour sessions led by an academic subject matter expert who will introduce 
the ambiguity in the subject matter through a short impulse introduction. The participants will be national 
delegates to the EU and NATO (as the primary sources of European security policies). The workshops will 
take place in Brussels to reduce travel costs and time to delegates and to enhance the attractiveness of 
participation for national delegations. 
 
The sessions will be conducted under Chatham House rules and delegates will be encouraged to discuss the 
terms conceptually, without the constraint of national policy positions. The sessions will not be recorded (in 
order to aid this open exchange) although the researchers will take notes of the sessions without attribution of 
remarks to individuals. 
 
The immediate output for each session is twofold – the primary purpose is to inform further understanding of 
the current state of discourses of cultures of security. This will result in an aggregate analysis in the form of a 
co-authored paper produced at the end of the first stage of the project and based on qualitative analysis of the 
sessions, but without attributing any specific comments to any participant or particular session. This paper 
will form the basis for the second stage of the research. 
 
The second output pending each session is to achieve immediate impact by influencing policy development 
directly through improvement of the discourse around key security terms in common use in both EU and 
NATO. (Hence the involvement of the staff officers directly involved in the discussions that formulate 
policy). This will be done through networking and acculturation of elements of this security discourse. In 
essence, this will generate a bottom-up evolution of understanding of key terms of the security lexicon. If the 
sessions are considered valuable by participants, the project might be adapted to conduct further iterations 
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involving national Principals (senior staff) or Institution (NATO and EU) personnel subsequently. 
  
These sessions will provide a good trial for the utility of the concept. Analysis from these workshops will 
inform a second series of workshops which will examine the impact on implementation of strategies derived 
from policies based on the ambiguous terms discussed. These sessions will be fine-tuned based on feedback 
from the first series, and will aim to include participation from the NATO and EU executive departments, 
national delegates and NGO and other stakeholders as appropriate. A preliminary overview of existing 
studies alongside the outcomes of the exploratory workshops leading to this proposed programme suggest 
'headline' strategies that appear relevant include NATO deterrence and defence strategies announced at the 
2018 Brussels Summit, the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation project (PESCO), the European 
Intervention Initiative (EII), and the Germany inspired Marshall Plan with Africa (2017), as well as the 2016 
EU Global Strategy (a shift from the 2003 European Security Strategy). 
 
This second series of workshop sessions are likely to be less informal than the first, with national positions 
informing delegates interventions more overtly. But drawing on the informal discussions from the first 
round, a genuinely informed and critical analysis of the strategies, their feasible implementation, and their 
possible impact is more viable than in any other format. 
 
The workshops aim to tease out these distinctions first by identifying terms and their meanings, and second, 
by analysing the presence of those terms across programs and policies.   This workshop programme is 
designed to provide a suitable research vehicle to provide the data that will test or substantiate the interim 
conclusions below, while at the same time enhance participants’ understanding of the context in which these 
key security terms are evolving.  
 
Based on research conducted with practitioners in NATO and EU, and experience gained within the NATO 
strategic HQ, this paper has examined the understanding of deterrence in theory and practice in the Alliance, 
and the nature of decision-making and practice. It has focused on reactions to activities of a newly assertive 
Russia across Europe’s Eastern borders from the Mediterranean to the High North, as well as non-traditional 
crises such as the destabilization from cyber-attacks, migrant waves and pandemic outbreaks.   
 
Its initial analysis suggests significant differences in understanding of deterrence have become manifest in 
the Alliance’s inability to adapt its strategy to the re-emerging salience of the concept of deterrence, and by 
extension resilience, in the European security environment after the Russian annexation of Crimea.  
 
Interim Conclusions 
Current NATO public definitions of deterrence are very carefully constructed but deliberately ambiguous in 
order to accommodate differing national interpretations of how, for example, deterrence works, and what it 
means in strategic, not policy, terms.   
 
Public policy use of these ambiguous definitions enables communication of ostensibly coherent public policy 
in deterrence.  It also, however, has the potential to create serious tensions in the internal development and 
implementation of strategies which should provide the unambiguous ‘fundamental principles’ on which 
Alliance (and National) operations are planned and conducted.   
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This ‘gap’ undermines the psychology of deterrence. This makes it vital to re-articulate and acculturate the 
concept and its application across both doctrine and policy.  
 
When applied in practice, these differences appear to curtail the Alliance ability to interpret and adapt 
political statements about deterrence and resilience into strategy.  This inhibits the Alliance ability to conduct 
a strategy of deterrence in a coherent and meaningful way prior to identification of a crisis, and significantly 
inhibits the ability to integrate all deterrence messaging elements once a crisis has been recognised.   
 
The Alliance needs to address shortcomings of both articulation and acculturation in order to enhance its 
strategic messaging of resolve and resilience quietly and consistently to deter an increasingly assertive 
Russia, or other adversary.  This does not require escalatory brinkmanship, but it does demand a more 
considered and coherent linkage between the various deterrence messaging tools available to the Alliance 
leadership and translated to its national membership.   
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